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Title: Profit Maximization in Deferred-Acceptance Auctions
Authors: Soumalias, Ermis Nikiforos
Φωτάκης Δημήτριος
Keywords: Automated Mechanism Design
Deferred-Acceptance Auctions
Multi-Unit Auctions
PAC Learning
t-level Auctions
Sample Complexity
Issue Date: 4-Sep-2020
Abstract: In this thesis we study the problem of revenue maximization for multi-unit deferred-acceptance auctions. Deferred-acceptance auctions have been studied extensively, but mostly for the objective of social welfare, and most studies have followed a worst case analysis approach. In this thesis our aim is to design deferred-acceptance auctions that, given some samples of the players' valuation distributions, achieve expected revenue close to optimal. We focus on two distinct environments, a single-parameter one, multi-unit auctions with bidders with additive valuation functions, and a multi-parameter one, multi-unit auctions with bidders with submodular valuation functions.
Appears in Collections:Διπλωματικές Εργασίες - Theses

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