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DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Soumalias, Ermis Nikiforos | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-09-18T08:22:05Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2020-09-18T08:22:05Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2020-09-04 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://artemis.cslab.ece.ntua.gr:8080/jspui/handle/123456789/17678 | - |
dc.description.abstract | In this thesis we study the problem of revenue maximization for multi-unit deferred-acceptance auctions. Deferred-acceptance auctions have been studied extensively, but mostly for the objective of social welfare, and most studies have followed a worst case analysis approach. In this thesis our aim is to design deferred-acceptance auctions that, given some samples of the players' valuation distributions, achieve expected revenue close to optimal. We focus on two distinct environments, a single-parameter one, multi-unit auctions with bidders with additive valuation functions, and a multi-parameter one, multi-unit auctions with bidders with submodular valuation functions. | en_US |
dc.language | en | en_US |
dc.subject | Automated Mechanism Design | en_US |
dc.subject | Deferred-Acceptance Auctions | en_US |
dc.subject | Multi-Unit Auctions | en_US |
dc.subject | PAC Learning | en_US |
dc.subject | t-level Auctions | en_US |
dc.subject | Sample Complexity | en_US |
dc.title | Profit Maximization in Deferred-Acceptance Auctions | en_US |
dc.description.pages | 109 | en_US |
dc.contributor.supervisor | Φωτάκης Δημήτριος | en_US |
dc.department | Τομέας Τεχνολογίας Πληροφορικής και Υπολογιστών | en_US |
Appears in Collections: | Διπλωματικές Εργασίες - Theses |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
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DT_Soumalias.pdf | 758.46 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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